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Similarly, while an investigation authorized by a governor by virtue of a special statute should be free from obstruction by a corrupt legislature, it is quite
possible that this independence could be used to harass any of the governor's
personal or political enemies under the guise of inspecting the operation of their
offices or "the public safety."
A one-man grand jury is in a similar position. The one-sided, secret operation
of a grand jury has been defended on the grounds that a person, if indicted, will
have an opportunity to vindicate himself on trial. 63 However, the expense,
trouble and social repercussions of a trial are great, and it might be questioned
whether one man should be empowered to impose this burden upon private
citizens or public officials.
The second problem is that connected with publicity. Through procedures of
many of the fact-finding agencies-closed hearing of legislative groups, grand
juries which are not allowed to issue reports, or executive commissions which
report only to the governor or a similar official-information gathered can be
suppressed from public knowledge. It would seem that the public has an interest in knowing what these agencies have found, but it must be remembered that
a great deal of adverse public opinion can be formed around unsubstantiated accusations or the presentation of extraneous bits of evidence. In many instances,
the accused has no opportunity to reply; in others, the reply is never publicized
to an extent which would eradicate the harm done to the individual by the accusation. The problem remains as to where the balance should lie between informing the public and protecting the individual from unfair pressures.
flash bulbs, spectators and other elements which might "disturb and distract" a witness.
United States v. Kleinman, 107 F. Supp. 407, 408 (D. D.C., 1952). The case is based on the
somewhat naive notion that "the only reason for having a witness on the stand... is to get
a thoughtful, calm, considered and ... truthful disclosure of facts." Ibid.
3 The absence of indictment is the primary argument used to prohibit grand juries from
making reports. See dissenting opinion of Woodward, J., in In re Jones, 101 App. Div.
55, 57 et seq., 92 N.Y. Supp. 275, 277 et seq. (1905).

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ILLINOIS CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION FINDINGS
Harrisonv. Civil Service Commission1 highlights the confusion that surrounds
the present scope of court review of findings of Illinois civil service commissions, 2 and raises the question of what course the courts will follow when grant1 347

Ill. App. 405 (1952), Robson, P. J., and Schwartz, J., specially concurring.
2 For a description of the civil service commissions and the procedures for discharge before
these commissions, see Civil Service Discharge Procedure in Illinois: Asset or Liability to
Good Government?, 47 Northwestern U.L. Rev. 660 (1953). The comment makes two recommendations: (1) the common-law exclusionary rules of evidence, originally designed to prevent dubious evidence from influencing poorly educated jurymen, should not be introduced
into hearings held before competent civil service commissioners; (2) the civil service commissions should be given considerably more latitude in recommending appropriate disciplinary action.
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ing such review in the future. Harrison, a police captain, was charged before the
Chicago commission with accepting a $30,000 gift from a notorious gambler as
a reward for bodyguard services Tendered. The commission ordered Harrison
dismissed from the police force. From this discharge order, Harrison initiated
proceedings under the Illinois Administrative Review Act 3 seeking judicial
review. The trial court found the issues in Harrison's favor and reversed the
commission's order. On appeal, the order of the commission was reinstated.
The court recognized that the Illinois cases on scope of judicial review of commission findings were in confusion, but declined the task of resolving the question. "Whether the instant record is reviewed for the limited purpose of determining... whether the plaintiff had a legal hearing.., and the Commission was not guilty of bad faith or gross abuse of discretion, or ... for the
purpose of determining whether the findings reached by the Civil Service Commission were against the manifest weight of the evidence, the result we have
4
reached, whichever premise is adopted, would be the same."
I
Prior to the passage of the Administrative Review Act, the courts' right to
review the findings of state and city civil ser ice commissions to some extent
through a writ of certiorari was well established.5 The statutes forming the
commissions generally provided for subpoena powers, the taking of testimony,
and a hearing.6 In view of such powers, the proceedings of the commissions were
termed "quasi-judicial," '7 and therefore subject to certiorari review, despite the
fact that the employee had no property right in a civil service job.' The scope of
review, as originally limited by the Illinois courts, extended only to the jurisdiction and procedural due process afforded in the administrative proceedings.9
Even before the Administrative Review Act, there was a movement toward
granting more extensive review. This trend was probably motivated by the
enormous growth in the number and power of administrative bodies.10 The
Illinois courts met the pressure for fuller review by expanding the concept of
"jurisdiction." By statute, removal for "cause" was a prerequisite to a valid
proceeding." The courts held that cause was jurisdictional and that the facts
IIll. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 110, § 264 et seq.
4 347 Ill. App. at 413 (1952).
5For a general discussion, see 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 270 (1947), noting Cartan v. Gregory,
329 111. App. 307, 68 N.E. 2d 193 (1946).
6
E.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 241, §§ 14, 51.
7 Field, Civil Service Law 224 (1939).
8Miller v. Chicago, 234 Ill. 416, 84 N.E. 1044 (1908) (mandamus); Powell v. Bullis, 221
IIl. 379, 77 N.E. 575 (1906); Joyce v. Chicago, 216 Ili. 466, 75 N.E. 184 (1905). Contra: Kusel v.
Chicago, 121 Ill. App. 469 (1905), where the court held that the proceedings before the commission were executive and not subject to court review.
9Joyce v. Chicago, 216 Ill. 466, 75 N.E. 184 (1905).
10 For a discussion of how the problem was met in other jurisdictions, see Univ. Chi. L.
Rev., op. cit. supra note 5, at 272.
1fI1. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 241, §§ 14, 51.
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relied on to prove cause were jurisdictional facts subject to review by the
courts.12 Thus, while the courts did not say that there was insufficient evidence
to sustain the charge, they gained the power to review the evidence by saying
1
that there was insufficient evidence to showjurisdiction.
To meet the exigencies
of each case, the courts alternated between a view merely requiring a showing
that the commission acted upon evidence, 14 to a view that there must be "evidence fairly tending to sustain the order."1 5
Perhaps a better insight into the real scope of review being granted by the
courts may be gained on an operational level through a consideration of the
amount of evidence the court required to be included in the return to the writ.
In those cases limiting the scope of review to jurisdiction and procedural due
process, or a mere showing that the commission acted upon evidence, the court
was not interested in inspecting and weighing the evidence; consequently, it
generally required no evidence whatever to be returned, but merely a certification by the commission that a hearing was had and evidence was taken. Scllau
v. Chicago's is an example of this position. There, a simple statement that there
was evidence to support the conclusion of guilty as charged was held sufficient.
Hopkins v. AmeS17 and People ex rel. Hollandv. Finn 8 held that it was necessary
that the cause be sustained by the facts, but that it was sufficient if the facts
were set out in the commission findings. On the other hand, cases employing a
scope of review that required evidence fairly tending to sustain the charge demanded more than a summarized commission finding. Thus, in Funkhouser v.
Coffin,"9 the court said that the record must contain the testimony upon which
the decision was based.
It appears that under the guise of "jurisdictional facts" the courts have
expanded and contracted the weight or consideration they give the evidence
to provide the desired solution in each case. The question has become, not
whether the courts will review the evidence, but rather, how far the courts are
in fact reweighing the evidence.
The courts are forced to the fiction of jurisdictional facts in their push for
broader review by the constitutional separation of powers of the state govern-.
ment into executive, judicial and legislative departments. 2 The courts have held
12Funkhouser v. Coffin, 301 Ill.
257, 133 N.E. 649 (1921).
13Funkhouser v. Coffin, 221 fll.-App. 14, 20 (1921).
14Schlau v. Chicago, 170 ll. App. 19 (1912) (mandamus).
Is
See Funkhouser v. Coffin, 301 Ill.
257, 133 N.E. 649 (1921). For a discussion of the
Funkhouser decision, see Univ. Chi. L. Rev., op. cit. supra note 5.
16 170 I1. App. 19 (1912) (mandamus).
17 344 I1. 527, 176 N.E. 729 (1931).
18247 IIl. App. 53 (1927).
9301 Ill.
257, 133 N.E. 649 (1921). See Murphy v. Houston, 250 Ill.
App. 385 (1928),
which interpreted the Funkhouser decision as requiring the substance of the evidence, not
merely the conclusions drawn therefrom; Carroll v. Houston, 341 Ill.
531, 536, 173 N.E. 657,
659 (1931); Fosse v. Allman, 329 Ill.
App. 296, 68 N.E. 2d 203 (1946); Cartan v. Gregory,
329 Ill.
App. 307, 68 N.E. 2d 193 (1946).
210I1. Const. Art. III.
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that removal powers of the type exercised by the civil service commissions, while
quasi-judicial to the extent that they involve a hearing at which testimony is
taken, are nevertheless executive in nature.21 A review which permitted the
courts to exercise a broad discretion as to the fitness and qualifications of state
and local government employees would thus be in effect unconstitutionally
vesting executive power in the judiciary. 22 The quasi-judicial aspect of removal
will support, at most, a review as to jurisdiction. In such nonexecutive matters
as workmen's compensation and rate cases, 3 constitutional objections have not
arisen, and the courts have been able to reweigh the evidence and overturn the
findings where they are against the "manifest weight of evidence." The cases
reveal that this test is practically synonymous with the substantial evidence
rule prevailing in the federal and other jurisdictions. 24
II
The Administrative Review Act abolished common-law certioraris and
provided a unified procedure for judicial review of administrative findings. 2
Section 1127 provides that the determination by the reviewing court "shall
extend to all questions of law and of fact presented by the entire record" and,
further, that "findings and conclusions of the administrative agency on questions of fact shall be held primafacie true and correct."2 8
21

Hopkins v. Ames, 344 Ill.
527, 176 N.E. 729 (1931).
v. Schoeberlein, 230 I1.496, 82 N.E. 860 (1907), in which a trial de novo was
authorized. For a discussion of the Schoeberlein decision, see Northwestern U.L. Rev., op. cit.
supra note 2, at 669-70, suggesting that since the functions of government on the local administrative level have become commingled, the separation of powers concept in this regard
is questionable. Consult Matter of La Guardia v. Smith, 288 N.Y. 1, 41 N.E. 2d 153 (1942).
23Railroad Trainmen v. Elgin J. & E. R. Co., 374 Ill.
60, 28 N.E. 2d 97 (1940); Liberty
Foundries Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 373 11.146, 25 N.E. 2d 790 (1940); Utilities Comm'n
v. Toledo, St.L. & W.R. Co., 286 Ill.
582, 122 N.E. 158 (1919); Mohler v. Dep't of Labor,
409 I1. 79, 97 N.E. 2d 762 (1951). It might be noted, in passing, that the manifest weight rule
is a judicial, and not a legislative, standard. Indeed, an attempt by the legislature to prescribe
such a test would be, in Illinois, an unconstitutional usurpation of judicial power. Otis Elevator
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 302 I1.90, 134 N.E. 19 (1922).
24See Peoples Gas Light Co. v. Slattery, 373 Ill. 31, 25 N.E. 2d 482 (1940).
2Certiorari and mandamus were usually used interchangeably to determine the rights of
discharged employees. Schlau v. Chicago, 170 Ill.
App. 19 (1912); Blanchly v. Coffin, 279 Il.
401, 117 N.E. 85 (1917); Lane v. Lindblom, 215 Ill.
58, 74 N.E. 73 (1905). Except for appeals
under statutes, Aurora v. Schoeberlein, 230 III. 49o, 82 N.E. 860 (1907), prohibition appears to
be the only other method used to seek judicial review of civil service commission findings.
Blasi v. Burdett, 195 Ill.
App. 255( 1915). For a general discussion of the means of review prior
to the Administrative Review Act, see Northwestern U.L. Rev., op. cit. supra note 2, at 66670; Review of Administrative Orders in Illinois, 31 Ill.
L. Rev. 230 (1936).
26The procedure applies only to those civil service commissions brought under the Act by
legislative enactment, e.g., Illinois Civil Service Commission, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951), c. 24J,
§ 14; Chicago Civil Service Commission, ibid., at § 77a; Chicago Park District Civil Service
Commission, ibid., at § 113.1; Chicago Sanitary District Civil Service Commission, ibid., at
c. 42, § 323.14. The Cook County Civil Service Commission is not yet subject to the Act.
27 Ill.
Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 110, § 274.
28The prima facie presumption of the statute would, of course, be rebuttable. Morrison v.
Flowers, 308 Ill.
189, 139 N.E. 10 (1923); People v. Polhemus, 367 Ill.
185, 10 N.E. 2d 966
(1938).
22 Aurora
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Section 11 was interpreted with regard to civil service cases by the Illinois
Supreme Court in Drezner v. Civil Service Commission.29 The court held that it
must "consider the record to determine if the findings of the administrative
agency are borne out by the evidence in the cause and whether or not the findings are against the manifest weight of evidence." 3
The extension into the civil service field of the "manifest weight" formula
employed theretofore in "rate-type" cases only, was attacked as unconstitutional by Judge Schwartz, concurring in the Harrison case. Judge Schwartz
argued that the hiring function is purely executive, in contrast to the cases involving workmen's compensation and rate cases which adjudicate and protect
the interests and rights of individuals. He concluded that the judiciary may
examine the evidence only to determine "whether the trial was a farce, or the
conclusion of the commission capricious, unreasonable and arbitrary. The ultimate purpose of this examination is the solution of the question-'Was he discharged for cause?' or was the proceeding a cloak for action motivated by political or other personal bias?" 3' Thus, Judge Schwartz would limit judicial review
of civil service findings under the statute to the contracted scope of early
decisions.
On the operational level, the recent case of Kennedy v. Hurley32 is consistent
with a rule of limited review. In that case, Kennedy, a policeman, was discharged for violation of the rules prohibiting outside activities when it was
learned that he was intimidating private detectives. Eleven years elapsed from
the commission's determination of the case until the hearing for court review,
and in the interim, the transcript of evidence from the commission disappeared. 3 The court was called upon to determine whether the return had to
include a transcript of evidence. It held that the transcript was unnecessary
and that a summarized statement of the facts as found by the commission
would suffice.
III
The present confusion in the cases as to scope of review of civil service commission findings suggests that the resolution of the problem may more properly
be sought in the practical merits of a broad or narrow rule than in arguments
based on constitutional or judicial authority.
At the outset, it might be well to articulate the broad and narrow rules as
precisely as possible. The broad rule is usually framed in terms of reversing the
Ill. 219, 75 N.E. 2d 303 (1947).
21 Accord: Secaur v. Civil Service Comm'n, 408 Ill. 197, 96 N.E. 2d 464 (1951). Under the
manifest weight formula, the Drezner court appears, in effect, to have reweighed the evidence
and substituted its determination for that of the Commission. For a discussion of the two cases,
see Northwestern U.L. Rev., op. cit. supra note 2, at 670-72.
"1See Drury v. Hurley, 339 Ill. App. 33, 88 N.E. 2d 728 (1949).
- 348 Il. App. 265 (1952).
33 On the appellate level, appellants must appeal within ninety days of the order complained of, and must specify, within ten days of notice of appeal, the portions of the trial
record to be made the record on appeal. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 110, § 200; fI1. App. Ct.
Rules of Practice, Rule 1(1)(a), in 349 -1l. App. at p. iii (1953).
29398
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commission when its findings are against the "manifest weight of the evidence,"
or when there is lack of "evidence fairly tending to sustain the order." In terms
of the "reasonable man" usually referred to in such cases, the broad rule of review would permit the court to upset the commission if, but only if, the evidence
presented before the commission was insufficient to enable a reasonable man to
arrive at the commission's conclusion. The narrow rule would focus on the
motivation of the commission, with the record being utilized by the court only
in order to decide whether the discharge was the result of political or other bias,
or was of so capricious and arbitrary a nature as to indicate a "fraudulent" intent on the part of the commissioners, in that they were willfully disregarding
34
the facts of the case
The values that must be reconciled in civil service cases are the right of the
employee to be safeguarded from removal for other than just cause and the
interest of the public in an efficient civil service. Employee rights already receive
fairly thorough protection apart from judicial review. The employee can be
discharged only if, after notice of written charges and a public hearing at which
he may be represented by counsel, 3 a commission of more or less nonpartisan
makeup 3" is persuaded that, on the facts, just cause for dismissal exists. The
presence of a Civil Service Protective Association, with counsel to advise
7
employees as to their rights, may act as a further check on arbitrary action.1
Broad court review would extend added protection to the employee against
unjust dismissal based on errors of judgment or insufficient evidence. On the
other hand, this judicial structure may create a formidable obstacle to the
removal of an employee for cause, in that the time, effort, and expense necessary
to secure a discharge are increased. As a result, in certain cases an employee
who is a detriment to the service may be retained improperly.3" Two other

11This is similar to the scope of review in tax assessment cases. Harding v. Atwater, 362
Ill. 546, 533, 1 N.E. 2d 46 (1936).
In several cases, the court apparently refused even to review the alleged fraudulent motivation of the civil service commission. Smith v. Chicago, 343 II. App. 267, 98 N.E. 2d 602 (1951),
where petitioner charged he was treated differently because he was a Negro; Quinn v. Chicago, 178 Ill. App. 115, 118 (1913) (semble).
"Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951), c. 24 2, §§ 14, 51; c. 34, § 64.30; c. 42, § 323.14.
3"E.g., the Civil Service Act provides, both as to state and city commissions, that not
more than two of the three commissioners shall be of the same political party at the time of
appointment. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 24 , §§ 1, 39.
"7The association obtains information on the discharge of civil service employees and
makes this information available to legislators, to the press, and to organizations and individuals interested in the civil service system.
38The contention that broad court review, with an order of reinstatement in doubtful
cases, will improve morale by increasing job security, may be balanced against the adverse
effects on the service that may result by placing leaders of doubtful character over other
employees. E.g., Harrison had been removed before by the commission only to be reinstated by
the courts as a leader in the police force. Other names appearing in several review cases are
contained in Cartan v. Gregory, 329 Ill. App. 307, 68 N.E. 2d 193 (1946).

1953]

COMMENTS

747

factors contribute to this result. First, the trial courts appear unduly sympathetic to the appeals of discharged employees. A survey of forty cases, chosen
at random, indicates that the trial court reversed the commission and reinstated the employee twenty-nine times. Of these twenty-nine cases, the apellate
court affirmed only seven, reversing the trial court in twenty-two decisions. It
has been suggested "that these decisions can only be explained by the fact that
politics are still very much a part of our government."3 9 Second, while the
ultimate control over appeals from the trial courts lies in the hands of the
commissioners, these commissioners are inevitably greatly influenced by the
advice of their attorneys. In Chicago, these attorneys are furnished by the
office of the Corporation Counsel, and in Cook County, by the State's Attorney's office. Such agencies are often vulnerable to the application of political
pressure.
In light of the above factors, the following proposals are advanced:
(1) The courts should employ a rule of narrow review in civil service cases.
Such a rule could deal with the political discharge, since as a part of their inquiry into the procedural due process afforded the employee, the courts could
deal with questions of bias. Once the political element is eliminated, the frequency of unfair dismissal is probably insignificant. In order that the reviewing
court may be able to evaluate the fairness of the administrative proceeding, the
commission should be required to return the full record, including the transcript
of testimony.
(2) The commissions should be empowered to retain their own counsel. This
step would consolidate control over appeals in an agency which may have a
more accurate idea of the impact of a given reinstatement on the integrity of the
service, and which, by virtue of its at least nominally nonpartisan composition,
may be less open to political influence than the agencies presently furnishing
legal counsel to the commissions.
(3) A discharged employee should be permitted, and required, to appeal his
dismissal directly to an appellate court.4" Since, at present, both trial and appellate courts are supposed to apply precisely the same rule of review, the necessity
of the two-step procedure is not immediately apparent. Its elimination would
economize the time and money of both the employee and the commission, and
would avoid the political pressures that appear to be operative at the trial
court level.
"1See Northwestern U.L. Rev., op. cit. supra note 2, at 673.
40In the federal structure, this procedure is the usual provision for judicial review of
administrative action. See, e.g., Davis, Administrative Law 726 (1951), where nineteen statutes
embodying such procedure are gathered. Presumably, the situation in Kennedy v. Hurley, 348
Ill. App. 265 (1952), page 745 supra, the disappearance of the transcript of evidence, would
be prevented by the new Illinois Appellate Court Rules of Practice. See note 33 supra.
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TAXATION OF FOUND PROPERTY AND OTHER WINDFALLS
Eisner v. Macomber dies a slow death.
-Douglas, J., dissenting.*
The question of whether property found unexpectedly is income to the finder
within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment' and Section 22(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code2 was discussed in a recent tax service bulletin,3 which
expressed the opinion that the fair market value of such property is income to
its finder. The bulletin recognized that the problem of found property is but one
aspect of the larger problem of "windfalls."
The term "windfall" denotes value which is received by a person unexpectedly as a result of good fortune rather than as a result of effort, intelligence, or the
venturing of capital. Appreciation in the value of property has occasionally
been termed a windfall in the literature. 4 To the extent that such gain is the
result of intelligent risking of capital by the investor, this terminology seems
misleading. Only those gains from "an unsought, uncalculated, unexpected,
fortuitous rise... in the value of... previously existing assets ' 5 may appropriately be termed windfalls. In the capital gain field, the law has made no
distinction between windfall and other gains. All realized capital gains are
considered taxable income under the definition in Eisner v. Macomber:' " 'Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both
combined,' provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or
conversion of capital assets. . .

."

With regard to non-capital gain windfalls,

however, the law is less clear. The Internal Revenue Code is silent on the
question, and thus far the field has been developed solely through the courts.
*

Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 404 (1943).

U.S. Const. Amend. 16: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States,
and without regard to any census or enumeration."
2Int. Rev. Code § 22(a): "'Gross income' includes gains, profits, and other income derived
from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal services.., of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations... or sales or dealings in property... growing
out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends,
securities, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and
income derived from any source whatever."
35 CCH 1953 Fed. Tax Rep. 8730. See Edward J. Dougherty v. Comm'r, 10 T.C.M.
320 (1951), recognizing, but not deciding, question whether found money was income within
statute.
4
Tax Institute, Panel Discussion, Capital Gains Taxation (1946): Professor Seltzer:
"Another concept of income from which capital gains and losses are reasonably excluded
might be termed the prudent consumption concept. This widely held concept distinguishes
between regularly recurring income and windfalls on the ground that only the former may be
prudently spent." Professor Seltzer, however, does not believe that all capital gains are
windfalls. See text at note 5 suprra.
6 Seltzer, The Nature and Tax Treatment of Capital Gains and Losses 53 (1951).
6252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920). In Merchant's Loan and Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509
(1921), it was held that the word "income" in the 16th Amendment included a gain from a
single sale as well as profits from sales by one engaged in the business of buying and selling.
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1. ARE WINDFALLS EXCLUDED FROM INCOME BY THE "MACOMBER" DEFINITION?

The first case on the taxation of non-capital gain windfalls was CentralRailroad Company v. Commissioner7 decided in 1935 by the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit. The CentralRailroad case held that a recovery of profits made
by a corporate officer who had engaged in surreptitious business operations
adverse to the interests of the corporation did not constitute income to the
corporation. The court based its decision on an extremely literal application of
the Eisner v. Macomber definition of income. The court said: "[Tihe value of
the property ... cannot be traced to either capital or labor ....
[W]hat it [the
corporation] received was in the nature of a 'windfall.' It was a penalty imposed
by the law on a faithless fiduciary, a gain granted gratuitously because of the
necessity of keeping persons in positions of trust beyond the temptation of
double dealing.... Moreover, the settlement was not based on a suit by the
taxpayer to recover profits of which it had been deprived." 8
In 1941, Arcadia Refining Company v. Commissioner9 was decided by the
Fifth Circuit. Here, money was received in settlement of a lawsuit against an
9fficer who had appropriated assets of his corporation to finance a profitable
competing enterprise. The proceeds of settlement were held taxable income to
the corporation, with the exception of that part allocable to the conversion of
assets, which part represented only a return of capital. In reaching this result,
the court in the Arcadia case may not have treated the situation as involving a
windfall. The Board of Tax Appeals below (now the Tax Court) had found that
the recovery was of "profits" taxable as income and the reviewing court simply
decided that the finding of the Board was fully supported by the evidence and
should not be disturbed. Yet the case does not indicate whose profits were being
recovered. If the profits were actually earned by the corporation and kept by
the officer as agent in breach of his fiduciary duty, there would be little question
that they would be taxable income to the corporation. If the profits were
actually earned by the officer and were awarded to the corporation solely to
punish the officer for his breach of duty in earning profits, the recovery would
be a windfall, and holding it taxable conflicts with the Central Railroad case.
If the profits were actually earned by the officer but awarded to the corporation
7 79 F. 2d 697 (C.A. 3d, 1935).

Ibid., at 699. While the corporation's suit was not framed as an action to recover lost
profits, it may be that taxpayer's dealings with its officer, in the form of leases and contracts
with a corporation controlled by the officer, reduced taxpayer's profits below the level they

might have reached absent such dealings. To the extent of such loss of profits, taxpayer's
recovery would not be a true windfall and would be taxable as ordinary income. In addition,
the fact that taxpayer, by suing, expended some "effort" in gaining its recovery might take
the case out of the "windfall" category as generally understopd. But the tendency of the
courts is to disregard the lawsuit as such as the "cause" of the recovery and to focus on the
underlying situation which prompts the relief. Cases involving deductibility of legal expenses
similarly turn on the nature of the underlying activity. Cf. Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S.
118, 123 (1952), noted in 20 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 247 (1953).
9 118 F..2d 1010 (C.A. 5th, 1941).
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because they should have been profits of the corporation in that the opportunity
to earn them was a corporate opportunity which the officer wrongfully usurped,
then it would seem their recovery would be income under the common notion
that damages awarded in lieu of income are income. 10 The fact that assets of the
corporation were used to produce the income in the Arcadia case, and not in
the CentralRailroad case, seems to distinguish the cases and strengthens the
corporate opportunity analysis of the former. Alternatively, it could be argued
that the recovery in the Arcadiacase may be considered to have been of profits
derived from the capital of the corporation itself since its assets were used in
producing the profit. Thus the profit would literally fall within the Eisner v.
Macomber definition of taxable income. In any event, the Arcadia case does
not consider the fund involved explicitly from a windfall viewpoint, nor does it
even cite the Central Railroad case. Moreover, the Arcadia case itself has not
been cited in subsequent windfall opinions.
Between the decisions in the Central Railroad case and the Arcadia case, a
1940 decision by the Board of Tax Appeals, HighlandFarms Corporation,"held
punitive damages awarded in an action for slander of title and willful interference in the conduct of taxpayer's business not to be income. The reasoning
was that these damages were awarded neither for loss of capital nor for loss of
profits, but as a penalty, and CentralRailroadhad already declared that penalties did not fall within the definition of taxable income set forth in Eisner v.
Macomber. In August 1952, this reasoning was reaffirmed by the Tax Court in
Glenshaw Glass Company,12 involving the punitive damage portion of a tripledamage antitrust settlement. The Tax Court cited Central Railroad and Highland Farms and declared its adherence to the "rule of long standing that has
never been questioned in any court" that sums received in settlement of
punitive damage claims do not constitute taxable income.13
In November 1952, two and one-half months after the Glenshaw case, a decision by the Court of Claims, Park & Tilford Distillers Corporationv. United
States,14 rejected Central Railroad and Highland Farms insofar as they relied
upon the definition of income in Eisnerv. Macomber;the Glenshaw case was not
cited. Park & Tilford held that insider's profits turned over to taxpayer cor"Plumb, Income Tax on Gains and Losses in Litigation, 25 Cornell L.Q. 221 (1940).
1142 B.T.A. 1314 (1940).
CCH Tax Ct. Rep. 19,146, 18 T.C. No. 108 (1952).
"3Whether defendant in an antitrust suit can deduct the triple damage payment from his
taxable income either as a loss or an expense raises the question of whether Congress's purpose
in providing triple damages was to induce injured parties to sue and thereby aid in the enforcement of the antitrust laws, or simply to punish the guilty party. However, even if the
congressional intent were primarily to offer plaintiffs an inducement to sue, it would not
automatically follow that defendants should be granted relief from the consequence of their
misdeeds in the form of tax reduction. Cf. Comm'r v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 148 F.
2d 276 (C.A. 5th, 1945), which held that amounts paid in compromise of state antitrust suit
are not deductible as business expenses. Accord: Universal Atlas Cement Co. v. Comm'r,
171 F. 2d 294 (C.A. 2d, 1948).
14 107 F. Supp. 941 (Ct. Cl., 1952).
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poration in accordance with the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act"
were income to the corporation under the "any source whatever" phrase of
Section 22(a). The definitional language in Eisner v. Macomber was limited to
the special problem of whether a realization of gain had occurred on the declaration of a stock dividend, a problem not involved in Park & Tilford. The court
said:
It is not, and we think could not rationally be, suggested that Congress lacks the
power to tax windfalls as income ....

A windfall may, of course, be a gift, and thus

expressly exempt from income tax. But if, as in the instant case, the windfall is
clearly not a gift, but a payment required by a statute,... we do not see how its

exemption could be reconciled with the reiterated statements that Congress intended,
by Section 22(a), to tax income to the extent of its constitutional power. 16
GeneralAmerican Investors Company,17 decided by the Tax Court in December 1952, shortly after Park& Tilford, followed the Court of Claims decision in
that case by holding that insider's profits recovered by a corporation were
taxable income to the corporation. The court distinguished HighlandFarms and
Glenshaw simply on the ground that these two cases involved punitive damages.18 The court did not make clear, however, why the difference in fact between punitive damages and insider's profits should lead to a different tax
result.
A concurring opinion quoted the peculiar language of the Securities Exchange
Act, 9 which provides that insider's profits shall "inure to and be recoverable
by" the corporation, and then concluded, "Thus the profits here in question
were income of the petitioner within ... 22(a) since they were 'profit' either
from 'sales or dealings in property *** growing out of ownership of *** or

interest in such property' or 'from any source whatever.'" The concurring
judge, however, does not make explicit the logic by which he moves from the
language of the Securities Exchange Act to the conclusion of taxability. The
words of the Act might be used to support any one of three possible constructions: (1) profits will be considered as earned by the officer, but the corporation
shall have a legal right to recover them; (2) although the profits will be considered earned by the officer, they become the property of the corporation from
IsSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(b) (1951).
16107 F. Supp. at 943-44.
17 CCH Tax Ct. Rep. 19,372, 19 T.C. No. 73 (1952).
18The taxpayer in Park &Tilford urged that the payment of insider's profits was a penalty
imposed upon the insider. The court, however, said that this question would be of importance
only where the insider sought to deduct the payment from his taxable income as a loss or an
expense. In this event, the deductibility might depend upon whether the policy of the law is to
penalize the insider for doing acts which the law wishes to discourage, or whether the insider
is to be permitted to bolster the market for the securities of his corporation but only prevented
from retaining the gains. The Tax Court has held that the insider is not entitled to the deduction. William F. Davis, Jr., 17 T.C. 549 (1952).
19Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(b).
(1951).
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the moment they are earned; or (3) the corporation itself will be considered
the earner. The first construction simply raises the windfall question, and
appears to be the situation the majority was assuming. The second construction
will not necessarily result in a tax to the corporation. In other cases, such as
assignment by a wage-earner of his right to future wages, the income is taxable
to the earner irrespective of whether the legal title to the income ever rests in
him even momentarily. 0 The third construction would seem to be the only one
on which the concurring opinion could rely and yet it seems a strained interpretation of the words "inure to and become recoverable by." Further, as a matter
of fact, the effort, and thus the act of "earning," was all on the part of the
insider, not the corporation.
In the most recent windfall case, William Goldman Theaters, Inc.,21 decided in
January 1953, the Tax Court relied on the Glenshaw, Highland Farms, and
CentralRailroad cases in holding that the two-thirds of a triple-damage judgment in an antitrust suit which represented punitive damages was not income.
Park & Tilford was not mentioned. In distinguishing the General American
case, the court highlighted, as did the majority in General American, the fact
that punitive damages were not insider's profits. The court also referred to the
same wording of the insider's profit statute which had been relied on by the
concurring opinion in General American.
Thus Park & Tilford refused to extend the vitality of the Eisnerv. Macomber
definition of taxable income beyond the facts of that case. The CentralRailroad,
HighlandFarms, and Glenshaw cases used the definition to determine taxability
of windfalls. In distinguishing these earlier cases rather than overruling them,
the Tax Court, in GeneralAmerican and William Goldman Theaters,has created
two classes of windfalls: penalties and insider's profits. If a case of found property arises, the court will be faced with the problem of whether such property is
more like the nontaxable penalty or the taxable recovery under the Securities
Exchange Act.
Perhaps a more appropriate interpretation of Section 22(a) would be to hold
that all windfalls, including penalties, are taxable income under its sweeping
language. A Treasury Regulation interpreting Section 22(a), which provides
that income means "all wealth which flows in to the taxpayer other than as a
mere return of capital,"22 would seem to suggest this result. Insofar as the policy
of Section 22(a) is to impose similar tax burdens on persons in similar circumstances, there is no basis for distinguishing value received as a windfall and, for
example, value received as a salary. By the same reasoning, there is no basis for
distinguishing between an award of value labelled "penalty" and one labelled
20Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). See also Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940)
(taxing donor of bond interest coupon on interest when received by donee-owner).
21 CCH Tax Ct. Rep.
19,401, 19 T.C. No. 79 (1953).
22 Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.21-1.
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"insider's profits." 23 To the extent that the income tax is progressive, and to
the extent that it is desirable to have the burden of the progression fall upon the
people with the greatest addition to their economic power within the given
period, the same reasoning would apply.
It may be thought that a person who receives value only sporadically is not
in the same circumstance as a person who receives the identical value from a
recurring source. The argument is that a prudent man will regard sporadic
receipts differently and will not treat them as available for ordinary consumption. 4 From this it is concluded that the receipts should be taxed at a lower rate
or not taxed at all. But it may be concluded with equal logic that the receipts
should be taxed at an even higher rate, for the recipient does not depend upon
them for subsistence. In any case, the Internal Revenue Code, by and large, has
rejected the sporadic-receipt argument, except that those gains falling within
the technical term "capital gain" are taxed at a bargain rate. In addition, no
distinction is made between the sporadic income of a prize fighter and the stable
income of a college professor.u
I.

PROBLEMS OF BASIS IF WINDFALLS ARE EXCLUDED FROM INCOME

If it is assumed that windfalls are to be excluded from taxable income by the
definition of income in Eisnerv. Macomber, one resulting basis problem may be
suggested by the following example: On January 1, A finds $5,000 cash and B
finds property with a fair market value of $5,000. A immediately spends his
$5,000 cash for consumption purposes; B sells the property and spends the
$5,000 proceeds for consumption purposes. B's resulting position is identical
with that of A. A pays no tax. However, B can avoid a tax only if he is to be
assigned a basis of $5,000 for the found property. It is not clear whether the
Internal Revenue Code, as now interpreted, will permit B to take such a basis.
The Code defines basis as cost.28 Since the found property does not appear to
have "cost" B anything, it would seem that his basis for the property would be
zero. This would result in a taxable gain of $5,000 on the sale of the property.
23 Cf. the concept of income in Simons, Personal Income Taxation (1938), as including
"(1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption, and (2) the change in the value of the
store of property rights between the beginning and the end of the period in question." Ibid.,
at 50. See text at note 22 supra.
24Seltzer, op. cit. supra note 5, at 25.

2 It is sometimes suggested that receipts not includible in the concept "national income"
should not be taxed to the recipient. National income "denotes, broadly, a measure of the net
results of economic activity in a community during a period of time." Simons, op. cit. supra
note 23, at 45. A windfall, being only a transfer of the result of economic activity rather than an
addition to the result of such activity, is not a part of national income. However, Simons
himself does not believe that the concept of national income has any place in the income tax.
Ibid., at 47.
26
I nt. Rev. Code § 113(a): "The basis of property shall be the cost of such property;
except that.. ." and then follows a list of specific exceptions which are not applicable here.
Section 113(b)(2) provides that a substitute basis shall be used in certain specific cases again
not applicable.
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A possible argument that would permit an escape from the use of the zero
basis is suggested by an analysis of the rule that one who pays an income tax
upon the receipt of property is entitled to a basis equal to the amount included
in his income.27 Two rationales have been suggested for this rule: (1) The
recipient has really incurred a cost-by the rendering of services, the surrender
of debts due him, or the like-equal to the value of what he has received. This
line of reasoning, however, does not explain the fact that the recipient of a
dividend in kind is allowed a basis although he has apparently incurred no
cost.2 8 (2) The recipient has been taxed on the value of the property to the extent that it has been included in income, and the basis given him is designed to
prevent a second tax on the same value when the property is sold. This rationale, however, does not adequately explain those cases in which the fair market
value of property at the time of receipt was improperly not reported as income,
and yet the property still received as a basis such fair market value.2 9
The first rationale will not aid the windfall finder of property, since he incurs
no cost. The second rationale, however, is an exception to the cost rule. It may
be argued that, if the law has a policy against taxing twice that which is income,
it ought also to have a policy against taxing once that which is not income at
all. It would seem that were found property not income if never sold, it should
not become income when it is sold.30 To hold otherwise would discriminate
against A, the finder of cash in the above example, as opposed to B, the finder of
other property which is subsequently sold for cash.
In Detroit Edison Company v. Commissioner,31 the Supreme Court held that
assets constructed with money furnished by customers had a basis of zero for
2
7 Treas. Reg. 111, § 29. 2 2(a)-1, provides that "if property is transferred by a corporation
to a shareholder, for an amount less than its fair market value.., such shareholder shall
include in gross income the difference between the amount paid for the property and the
amount of its fair market value.... In computing the gain, or loss from the subsequent sale
of such property its basis shall be the amount paid for the property, increased by the amount
of such difference included in gross income." The regulation provides a like increase in the
basis for property transferred by an employer to an employee for an amount less than its fair
market value. See also Surrey and Warren, Federal Income Taxation 466-67 (1950).
28 See Greenbaum, The Basis of Property Shall be the Cost of Such Property: How is the
Cost Defined?, 3 Tax L. Rev. 351 (1948).
21See, e.g., Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U.S. 106 (1935); Robbins v. United States, 21 F.
Supp. 403 (Ct. Cl., 1937). But see Timken v. Comin'r, 141 F. 2d 625 (C.A. 6th, 1944), and
Continental Oil Co. v. Jones, 177 F. 2d 508 (C.A. 10th, 1949), disallowing the higher basis
where the receipt of the property was improperly excluded from income.
30 It was once the law that the basis on sale for nontaxable stock dividends was zero.
Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238 (1937). Now the basis for the old stock is apportioned between the old and the new. Int. Rev. Code § 113(a)(19). The latter result seems more appropriate. Since a nontaxable stock dividend is really only the spreading out of an old investment,
presumably the value of each share after the dividend will fall in proportion to the amount of
the new issue. Therefore, the old system would produce false gains upon the sale of the new
stock and false losses upon the sale of the old, whereas the present system produces neither
false gains nor losses.
21319

U.S. 98 (1943).
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purposes of depreciation 2 The court appears to advance two arguments for
this result. First, since the property was paid for by customer funds, the company incurred no cost and was therefore not entitled to a basis under the cost
rule. Second, the customer funds, while they "were to the customer the price
of the service," were not taxed as income to the company, 33 and therefore did
not entitle the company to a basis under the inclusion-in-income rule.3 4 It could
be argued that the DetroitEdison case rests its holding of zero basis mainly on
the ground that, while neither the money nor the property was included in
income at the time it was received, it should be included in income at some
time. If it is decided that windfall found property is not income at all, the
DetroitEdison case does not necessarily preclude the finding of a positive basis
for such property.
If found property, not taxed as income to the finder, is to have a positive
basis when sold, the next basis problem is whether the basis should be the fair
market value of the property at the time it is found, at the time it is sold, or at
the time the statute of limitations has run against the loser. Returning to the
example discussed above, assume that B, instead of selling the property on
January 1, retains it until July 1, and that the statute of limitations bars the
loser's claim on March 1, by which date the market value of the property has
risen to $7,000. B sells the property July 1 for $8,000. Clearly, at least the final
$1,000 of appreciation should be taxed to B, since that appreciation was in the
value of an asset owned by B and was realized by sale. The additional appreciation of $2,000, however, took place while title to the property was vested in
the loser of the property. It could be argued that B therefore takes as his basis
$7,000, the value of the property at the time title vests in him, and that the
$2,000 appreciation between January I and March 1 is not income to him. But if
B's basis is not the value of the property when found, then the appreciation in
value during the running of the statute of limitations would escape tax altogether.
III. TREATMENT OF WINDFALLS IF NOT EXCLUDED FROM INCOME

If it is assumed that found property windfalls are not to be excluded from
taxable income by the definition of income in Eisnerv. Macomber, the questions
of when the tax is to be imposed, what basis is to be assigned the windfall
property, and what tax consequences will result from return of the property to
its owner remain to be considered. 5
3"

In this area the basis for depreciation is the same as the basis for gain or loss on sale.

Int. Rev. Code § 114(a).
33 The Court said that these receipts "had not been taxed as income presumably because
it had been thought to be prescribed by this Court's decision in Edwards v. Cuba Railroad
Company holding that... a government subsidy to induce railroad construction was not
income." Detroit Edison Co. v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 98, 103 (1943).
34 See text at note 27.
"The realization doctrine prevents taxation of appreciation in the value of an existing
property interest. See Roehner and Roehner, Realization: Administrative Convenience or
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It may be possible to impose the tax either when the property is found, when
the finder claims it as of right, or when the statute of limitations has run against
the loser. Once the statute has run, it appears clear that the finder should be
taxed if he has not been taxed before. But it may not be necessary to wait for
the expiration of the statute if the finder may be considered to hold the property
under a "claim of right and without restriction as to its disposition." 3 6 Commissioner v. Wilcox 37 added to the claim-of-right doctrine the requirement of
"the absence of a definite, unconditional obligation to repay or return that
which would otherwise constitute a gain. Without some bona fide legal or
equitable claim, even though it be contingent or contested in nature, the tax' 38
payer cannot be said to have received any gain or profit within section 22(a).)
This would mean, of course, that a finder could not be taxed until the statute of
limitations had extinguished his obligation to return. Rutkin v. United States,3"
although nominally distinguishing the Wilcox case, 40 appears to have erased this
requirement, opening the door once more to taxation of windfalls prior to the
41
running of the statute.
Constitutional Requirement, 8 Tax L. Rev. 173 (1953). The receipt of windfall found property,
however, constitutes a new property interest for the finder rather than appreciation in the
value of a previously existing interest.
If a natural resource, such as oil, is located as a result of the expenditure of capital and
labor in prospecting and drilling, there may be a question whether such nonwindfall finding is
a realization of value. If the oil rights in the land or the land on which the oil is found were
owned by the finder prior to discovery, he has apparently realized nothing by his finding;
he has merely engaged in activity which appreciated the value of an asset which he already
owned. It might be argued that the act of finding and preparing the oil for market so changes
its nature that a realization of its appreciation in value occurs. But the extraction of oil
appears indistinguishable from the ordinary manufacturing process, and the general rule is
that products of manufacture are not income until sold.
3 The "claim of right" doctrine was established by Justice Brandeis in North American
Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932): "If a taxpayer receives earnings under a
claim of right and without restriction as to its disposition, he has received income which he is
required to return, even though it may still be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the
money, and even though he may still be adjudged liable to restore its equivalent." Ibid., at 424.
37 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
38Ibid., at 408.
39
343 U.S. 130 (1952).
40The Wilcox case involved embezzlement while the Rutkin case involved extortion.
Although the Court in the Rutin case specifically said that it did not reach the facts in the
Wilcox case, it has been suggested that the authority of the Wilcox case has been destroyed.
See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1951 Term, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 89, 173 (1952). A possible distinction may be found in the fact that an embezzler never acquires legal title to the money,
whereas an extortioner does acquire legal title, subject only to an equitable right in the victim to get the money back.
4'
If the tax is put off until the full statute of limitations has run or until the finder has
unambiguously appropriated the property, the finder is being given a "free ride" in terms of
speculating in fluctuations of value of the property during the statutory period. If the law
were to swing to the opposite extreme and declare found property income the moment it is
found, the finder would be faced with the burden of paying a tax on property which he might
be diligently attempting to return to the true owner. Presumably, the value of the property
for income tax purposes and the beginning of the holding period would be determined by the
date upon which the property became income to the finder.
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The second problem in dealing with the taxation of windfall property is what
basis the property is to be assigned on sale. Assuming that the finder has
already been taxed on the property as income, he would take as his basis for
the property the value given it when it was included in his income.42 If the
finder has improperly failed to pay an income tax on the found property, the
cases are unclear as to whether he may be forced to take a basis of zero on
43
sale.
Whenever a finder who has paid a tax on windfall found property returns it
to its owner, the question arises whether an adjustment will be made either in
the form of a refund for the year the tax was paid or as a deduction for the year
in which the property was returned. In the 1947 case of Gargaro v. United
States,44 where taxpayer, entitled to a percentage of corporate net income,
figured the income incorrectly because the government later renegotiated a
contract with the corporation, the Court of Claims held that the prior return
should be amended because the money was received under a mistake of fact
and there "really' was an obligation to return. While the obligation was unknown, the Wilcox case had decided that if there was an unconditional obligation, the item was not income. Two years later, however, in Haberkorn v.
UnitedStates,45 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reached the opposite
result, citing North American Oil Consolidatedv. Burnet,46 which it claimed was
not overruled by the Wilcox case. In 1951, in United States v. Lewis,47 taxpayer
had included a bonus in his gross income when he received it, but was later
forced by subsequent litigation in a state court to give back a portion of the
bonus. The Supreme Court held taxpayer was not entitled to exclude that
portion of the bonus from his earlier income tax return. "Nothing in this language [North American case] permits an exception [to the claim of right notion]
merely because a taxpayer is 'mistaken' as to the validity of his claim." 48
If the person who returns found property previously taxed is to be denied a
refund, he may attempt to claim a deduction for the year in which the property
was returned. While it is difficult to point to any provisions of the Internal
4

See text at note 27 supra.

43 See

text at note 29 supra; but cf. text at note 34 supra.
73 F. Supp. 973 (Ct. CI., 1947). See also Greenwald v. United States, 57 F. Supp. 569
(Ct. Cl., 1944).
- 173 F. 2d 587 (C.A. 6th, 1949).
46 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
47 340 U.S. 590 (1951).
44

48 Ibid., at 591. In Healy v. Comm'r and Comm'r v. Smith, 73 S. Ct. 671 (U.S., 1953), taxpayers had received salaries from their corporate employers which they reported as income.
Later, part of each salary was held excessive and each taxpayer became liable as transferee
for the unpaid taxes of his employer corporation. The Supreme Court held that the past
returns for the years in which taxpayers had reported their salaries could not be reopened.
The Commissioner conceded, however, that the taxpayers were entitled to a deduction for a
loss in the year of repayment of the amount earlier included in income.
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Revenue Code that would permit such a result,49 it seems rough justice to
allow the deduction. 50
49For deductions from gross income, see Int. Rev. Code § 23.
10See, generally, on this problem, Mistake and the Claim of Right Doctrine, 46 I1. L.
Rev. 497 (1951). See also note 48 supra.
After this comment went to press, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made the following
ruling: "Gross income: Treasure-trove.-The finder of buried treasure is in receipt of taxable
income. The amount of the income is to be measured by its value in United States currency for
the taxable year in which it is reduced to undisputed possession." Rev. Ruling 61, 1953 Int.
Rev. Bull. No. 9, at 2, 5 CCH 1953 Fed. Tax Rep. 6171. The ruling appears to deal only with
property found as the result of labor and therefore taxable income even within the definition
in Eisner v. Macomber. The ruling does, however, make more certain that this result would,
in fact, be reached and, in addition, appears to answer the problem of when such property is

taxable income.

